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ABSTRACT Following the work of Basu in 1997, the excess of the sensitivity of
accounting earnings to negative share return over its sensitivity to positive share return
(the Basu coefficient) has been interpreted as an indicator of conditional accounting
conservatism. Although this interpretation is supported by substantial evidence that the
Basu coefficient is associated with likely demands for conservatism, concerns have
arisen that it may reflect factors not directly related to conservatism, and that this may
adversely affect its validity as an indicator of that phenomenon. We argue that evidence
on the validity of the Basu coefficient as an indicator of conditional conservatism can
be obtained by disaggregating earnings into components, classifying those components
by whether or not they are likely to be affected by conditional conservatism, and
examining whether the Basu coefficient arises primarily from components likely to be
affected by conditional conservatism. We implement this procedure for UK firms
reporting under FRS 3: Reporting Financial Performance from 1992 to 2004. Although
a substantial proportion of the Basu coefficient emanates from cash flow from operating
and investing activities (CFOI), which cannot directly reflect accounting conservatism,
its incidence across other components of earnings is predominantly within those
components likely to be affected by conditional conservatism. Also, although the bias
documented by Patatoukas and Thomas in 2009 is present in all of our aggregate
earnings measures, it is heavily concentrated in the CFOI component of earnings and
largely absent from components classified as likely to be affected by conditional
conservatism. With the important caveat that researchers should test the robustness of
their results to the exclusion of the element of the Basu coefficient due to cash flows, our
findings are consistent with the conditional conservatism interpretation of the coefficient.
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Basu (1997) defines accounting conservatism as a tendency on the part of accoun-
tants ‘to require a higher degree of verification for recognizing good news than bad
news in financial statements’ (p. 4), resulting in accounting earnings being more
timely in its recognition of bad news than in its recognition of good news. This
news-dependent conservatism that gives rise to asymmetric timeliness in earnings
is sometimes termed ‘conditional conservatism’ (Beaver and Ryan, 2005). Basu
(1997) proposes as an indicator of conditional conservatism the excess of the sen-
sitivity of earnings to contemporaneous negative share return, indicative of bad
news, over its sensitivity to contemporaneous positive share return, indicative of
good news. Here, we term this excess ‘the Basu coefficient’. Many studies have
reported that the Basu coefficient is associated with contracting-cost-related
items and other items predicted to be associated with conditional conservatism,
consistent with it being a reliable indicator of that phenomenon (Pope and
Walker, 1999; Ball et al., 2000, 2008a, 2008b; Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Sivakumar
and Waymire, 2003; Beekes et al., 2004; Krishnan, 2005; Pae et al., 2005;
Bushman and Piotroski, 2006; Lobo and Zhou, 2006; Ahmed and Duellman,
2007; Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007; Beatty et al., 2008; LaFond and
Roychowdhury, 2008; LaFond and Watts, 2008; Zhang, 2008). However, there
are grounds to question the conditional conservatism interpretation of the Basu
coefficient. Dietrich et al. (2007) argue that partitioning share-return and earnings
data by the sign of share return can give a positive Basu coefficient even in the
absence of accounting conservatism. Patatoukas and Thomas (2009) report that
association between return volatility and the probability of a loss can cause a
bias in the Basu coefficient large enough to induce an apparent sensitivity differ-
ence for lagged earnings with respect to return, which cannot be due to conditional
conservatism. Givoly et al. (2007) suggest that the Basu coefficient is sensitive to
factors such as clustering of news, the nature of economic events and firms’ dis-
closure policies. The positive sensitivity difference for operating cash flow with
respect to return, reported by Basu (1997), Ball et al. (2000) and Dietrich et al.
(2007), also suggests that the Basu coefficient may be due to factors other than con-
servatism. There have been a number of responses to critiques of the conditional
conservatism interpretation of the coefficient. Ball et al. (2010) analyse econo-
metric properties of the coefficient in light of the properties of accounting and
conclude that the coefficient is a valid indicator of conditional conservatism.
They also observe that managers’ remedial response to bad news might cause
asymmetry in the sensitivity of cash flow to bad news and good news; such asym-
metry would not be directly due to accounting conservatism. Ryan (2006) observes
that the study of conditional conservatism requires a measure of asymmetric
timeliness of earnings and that, despite possible faults, the Basu coefficient is a
dominant candidate for such a measure. He calls for researchers to synthesise
the Basu measure of conditional conservatism with their knowledge of its limit-
ations. In summary, there is extensive evidence consistent with the conditional






























conservatism interpretation of the Basu coefficient, there is some cause for concern
with regard to this interpretation, and there is reason for researchers of conserva-
tism to persevere with the Basu coefficient, with due recognition of its limitations.
In this study, we argue that evidence on the validity of the Basu coefficient as
an indicator of conditional conservatism can be obtained by disaggregating earn-
ings into its components, classifying those components by reference to account-
ing regulation and practice into those that are likely to be affected by conditional
conservatism and those that are not, and examining whether the Basu coefficient
arises primarily from components likely to be affected by conditional conserva-
tism. If the Basu coefficient arises primarily from earnings components likely to
be affected by conditional conservatism, this would represent evidence in support
of the conditional conservatism interpretation of the coefficient. If it arises from
earnings components independently of whether they are likely to be affected by
conditional conservatism or only (or mostly) from components unlikely to be
affected, this would cast further doubt on the conditional conservatism inter-
pretation of the coefficient.1 Although our procedure involves some subjectivity
in classification of earnings components by whether they are likely to be affected
by conditional conservatism, our detailed reference to accounting regulation and
practice significantly limits the degree of subjectivity involved.
We implement this procedure for a sample of UK firms from 1992 to 2004, which
is the interval during which FRS 3: Reporting Financial Performance (ASB, 1992)
was in force. In our data, a large proportion of the Basu coefficient arises from cash
flow from operating and investing activities (CFOI), which could reflect asymmetry
in response of cash flow to bad news and good news but cannot directly reflect con-
ditional conservatism. However, for components of earnings other than CFOI, the
incidence of the sensitivity difference in our data is predominantly consistent with
a conditional conservatism interpretation. Also, although the bias documented by
Patatoukas and Thomas (2009) is present in all of our aggregate earnings measures,
it is heavily concentrated in the CFOI component of earnings and largely absent from
components classified as likely to be affected by conditional conservatism. With the
important caveat that researchers should test the robustness of their results to the
exclusion of the element of the Basu coefficient due to cash flows, our findings
are consistent with the conditional conservatism interpretation of the coefficient.
The remainder of this study is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the
earnings components considered, and states our beliefs with regard to whether
or not individual earnings components are likely to be affected by conditional
conservatism. Section 3 describes the sensitivity-difference measure used in
the analysis. Section 4 describes the sample and data. Section 5 reports the
results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Decomposition of the Basu Coefficient: Earnings Components
In this section, on the basis of a review of UK accounting regulation and practice
for years from 1992 to 2004, we classify UK earnings components during that






























interval into items that are likely or not likely to be affected by conditional
conservatism.2 The interval from 1992 to 2004, during which FRS 3 was in
force, provides a relatively stable income-reporting regime, with a relatively
rich and transparent disclosure of income components that were well documented
by a major financial database.3
In Section 2.1 we provide an overview of UK earnings components reported
under FRS 3 from 1992 to 2004, and give details of our decomposition of earn-
ings. In Section 2.2, we state our expectations with regard to which components
are likely or not likely to be affected by conditional conservatism.
2.1. Earnings Components under FRS 3: Reporting Financial Performance
FRS 3 required firms to report operating profit, to include the separately disclosed
results of continuing operations, acquisitions and discontinued operations (para-
graph 14). The following three items, classified as ‘Special Items’ by Datastream,
were reported separately in the income statement as exceptional items outside
operating profit (paragraphs 19 and 20): (i) profits or losses on the sale or termin-
ation of an operation; (ii) costs of fundamental reorganisation or restructuring
having a material effect on operations; (iii) profits or losses on disposal of
fixed assets. Other exceptional items were reported under the headings to
which they related (paragraph 19), which could include ‘operating profit’. FRS
3 defined ‘extraordinary items’ as relating to ‘highly abnormal events or trans-
actions that fall outside the ordinary activities of a reporting entity and which
are not expected to recur’ (paragraph 48). Such items were expected to be of
extreme rarity, and no examples were given in the standard. The standard intro-
duced a requirement for a Reconciliation of Movements in Shareholders’ Funds,
nested within which was a Statement of Recognized Gains and Losses (para-
graphs 56–59). Taken together, these two statements reflected all movements
in shareholders’ funds. These included accounting gains and losses not reported
within net income, termed ‘dirty surplus flows’ in this study. The principal dirty
surplus flows were as follows: prior-period adjustments; foreign-currency trans-
lation differences; revaluation gains and losses; goodwill write-offs (net of good-
will written back on disposals), until the elimination by FRS 10: Goodwill and
Intangible Assets (ASB, 1997) for accounting periods ending on or after 23
December 1998 of the write-off to equity of goodwill; actuarial gains and
losses recognised in respect of pension schemes after FRS 17: Retirement
Benefits (ASB, 2000a), for which adoption became mandatory for accounting
periods ending on or after 22 June 2003. Items reported as dirty surplus flows
under FRS 3 also included various unusual items, including items described in
the financial statements as ‘other’ or similar.
Our decomposition of earnings is based on earnings components reported
under FRS 3 and some cash-flow components reported under FRS 1: Cash
Flow Statements (ASB, 1991), as reported by Datastream. Our classification of
earnings components by reference to whether they are likely to be affected by






























conditional conservatism is based on our review of accounting regulation and
practice, and not on whether the components are likely to be subject to contract-
ing-related demand for conditional conservatism. Therefore, we do not limit our
analysis to earnings components likely to be the focus of such contracting-related
demands. Our decomposition is with respect to clean surplus earnings, which
comprises all recognised gains and losses. Periodic clean surplus earnings is
defined as follows (firm subscripts are suppressed):
CSEt = Bt − Bt−1 + Dt − Nt (1a)
where CSEt is clean surplus earnings for period t, Bt and Bt−1 are the book value
of equity shareholders’ funds at the end of period t and period t − 1, respectively,
Dt and Nt are distributions to shareholders and share issues, respectively, reported
as movements in shareholders’ funds in the financial statements in period t.4 Our
decomposition of earnings is described in (1b). For each item, the notation used in
some tables is given in parentheses (firm and time subscripts are suppressed):
Cash flow from operating and investing activities (CFOI)(CFOI)
+ Investing accruals (including depreciation)(IA)
+ Change in accounts receivable (DAR)
+ Change in inventory (DInv)
+ (−Change in accounts payable (DAP))
+ Other operating accruals (OOA)
= Operating profit (OP)
+ Special and other non-operating items (Special + ONO)
+ Interest income less interest expense (Int)
= Pre-tax income (Pretax)
+ (−Taxation (Tax))
= Post-tax income (Posttax)
+ Extraordinary items (Extra)
+ (−Minority interest and preference dividends (Minpref ))
= Net income (Netinc)
+ Dirty surplus flows: prior-period adjustment (PPA)
+ Dirty surplus flows: foreign-currency translation adjustment (FCT)
+ Dirty surplus flows: revaluation gains and losses (Rev)
+ (−Dirty surplus flows: goodwill written off to equity,
net of goodwill written back on disposals (GW))
+ Dirty surplus flows: other dirty surplus flows (ODSF)
= Clean surplus earnings(CSE). (1b)






























Because of the possibility that cash flow from operations might be affected by
conservatism-related accounting choices with regard to the categorisation of
expenditures as ‘operating’ or ‘investing’, our cash-flow measure is CFOI
rather than cash flow from operations. We therefore include in our decomposition
a measure of investing accruals that comprises both depreciation and the
capitalisation of fixed assets and intangibles.
The return measure used in this study articulates with the distributions and
share issues reported as movements in shareholders’ funds in the financial state-
ments, and is defined as follows:
Rit = Vit − Vi,t−1 + Dit − Nit
Vi,t−1
(2)
where Rit is the share return for firm i for the accounting period ended at time t, Vit
(Vi,t−1) is the market value of equity shareholders’ funds of firm i at the end of
accounting period t (t − 1), and Dit and Nit are distributions to shareholders
and share issues, respectively, as previously defined. In order to ensure consist-
ency with the book value of equity shareholders’ funds, the market value of
equity shareholders’ funds is stated net of the creditor for equity shareholders’
dividends in the corresponding balance sheet.
2.2. Expectations Regarding Conditional-Conservatism-Induced Asymmetric
Timeliness in Earnings Components
Throughout the interval covered by this study, the prudence concept was expli-
citly recognised in UK GAAP. SSAP 2: Disclosure of Accounting Policies
(ASC, 1971) gave it the status of a ‘fundamental accounting concept’, and
required that ‘provision is made for all known liabilities (expenses and losses)
whether the amount of these is known with certainty or is a best estimate in
the light of the information available’ (part 2, paragraph (d)). For accounting
periods ending on or after 22 June 2001, SSAP 2 was superseded by FRS 18:
Accounting Policies (ASB, 2000b). This reflected some evolution in the prudence
concept, with a move to restrict the deliberate understatement of assets and gains
and the deliberate overstatement of liabilities and losses. This evolution of the
prudence concept had already been reflected in the previously issued Statement
of Principles for Financial Reporting (ASB, 1999b), of which an exposure
draft had initially been issued in 1995, in FRS 3, which restricted provisions
arising on termination of operations to cases where obligations had been incurred,
and in FRS 12: Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets (ASB,
1998), which prohibited the recognition of provisions other than for a present
obligation as a result of a past event. In summary, the concept of prudence was
explicitly embedded within UK GAAP for the interval covered by this study,
although the interval saw a process of evolution in the concept aimed at
restricting the opportunities for earnings management.






























We now identify those earnings components that we believe likely to be
affected by the conditional conservatism that the Basu coefficient is convention-
ally aimed to detect, and those that we believe are not likely to be affected. Our
earnings decomposition in (1b) includes five earnings measures: operating profit,
pre-tax income, post-tax income, net income and clean surplus earnings. These
earnings measures themselves are not the focus of this study, and are not dealt
with below, but the results of prior research suggest that positive Basu coeffi-
cients will be observed for these five earnings measures. Also, since taxation is
determined largely by pre-tax income, we do not consider this item, but expect
to observe a Basu coefficient of opposite sign to that observed for pre-tax
income. For a similar reason, in that part of the item is associated with an
element of post-tax income, we do not consider minority interest and preference
dividends.
We list below the earnings components that we classify as likely to be affected
by conditional-conservatism-induced asymmetric timeliness, giving our reason-
ing in each case.
. Investing accruals (including depreciation). FRS 15: Tangible Fixed Assets
(ASB, 1999a, paragraphs 34–41) provides some scope for managerial judge-
ment with regard to the categorisation of outflows as expenses or as additions
to fixed assets, particularly where items might be expensed as ‘repairs and
maintenance’ or capitalised as ‘enhancements’. Also, there is scope for revi-
sions in estimates of the useful economic life and residual value of fixed
assets to be reflected in depreciation charges.5
. Change in accounts receivable. Accounts receivable are subject to provisions
that can reduce their book value to below initial carrying value, but they cannot
be written up to above their initial carrying value.
. Change in inventory. SSAP 9: Stocks and Long-Term Contracts (ASC, 1975),
which was in force throughout the interval examined, required that inventory
should normally be stated at the lower of cost and net realisable value (para-
graph 26). Profit could only be taken on long-term contracts where there
was reasonable certainty about the outcome (paragraph 29). Under this
regime, inventories are more likely to be written down in response to bad
news than to be written up in response to good news.
. Other operating accruals. This component includes all operating accruals
other than depreciation and changes in receivables, inventories and accounts
payable. It mainly comprises items arising from litigation, impairments, dispo-
sals and non-fundamental reorganisation, reported as exceptional items within
operating profit. Timely recognition of losses in respect of such items, together
with the limited scope for the recognition of corresponding gains, is one of the
most likely sources of conditional conservatism.
. Special and other non-operating items. This component includes items relating
to termination and reorganisation of operations and disposal of fixed assets,
required by FRS 3 to be reported as exceptional items outside operating






























profit and reported as ‘Special Items’ by Datastream, plus other non-operating
items including items of an exceptional nature and the share of results of
associated companies and joint ventures. Although UK accounting standards
aimed to restrict over-provisioning for exceptional losses, the prudence con-
siderations reflected in SSAP 2 and FRS 18 would still have induced a tendency
to recognise losses in a more timely fashion than gains in respect of such
items.6
. Revaluation gains and losses. For accounting periods ending on or after 23
March 2000, asset revaluations in the UK were governed by FRS 15, which
codified much of pre-existing practice with regard to revaluation. Throughout
the interval covered by this study, revaluation gains and revaluation losses, to
the extent that the losses were reversals of previously recognised revaluation
gains, were recognised as dirty surplus flows in the Statement of Recognized
Gains and Losses. In light of the prudence concept, there is scope for asym-
metric timeliness in the recognition of gains and losses.
. Goodwill. During the first half of the interval covered by this study, until the
introduction in 1998 of FRS 10, the vast majority of UK firms wrote off pur-
chased goodwill directly to equity. Subsequent to FRS 10, direct write-off to
equity was prohibited, and this component comprised only the write-back on
disposal of goodwill previously written off to equity. Scope existed for man-
agerial judgement with respect to the value to be attributed to the net assets
of acquired subsidiaries, and therefore with respect to the component of the
purchase price of subsidiaries to be written off as goodwill.
As some of the items listed above are more likely than others to be affected by
conditional conservatism, it is helpful to provide some indication of the rank
ordering of the items by their likelihood of being affected by conditional conser-
vatism. Because they include exceptional items, the components termed ‘other
operating accruals’ and ‘special and other non-operating items’ are the most
likely items to be affected, and we rank them first equal. Because of the relative
significance of the items and the subjectivity involved in valuing them, we rank
third equal the change in accounts receivable and the change in inventory. We
rank investing accruals fifth. We rank sixth equal the dirty-surplus-flow items:
revaluation gains and losses and goodwill.
We now list the earnings components believed not likely to be affected by
conditional conservatism.
. CFOI. Our measure of this item is equal to operating cash flow less net cash
outflows on fixed assets and intangible assets, reported in the FRS 1 statement
of cash flows. This item is free of any conservatism effect arising from the
categorisation of expenditures as ‘operating’ or ‘investing’.
. Change in accounts payable. Accounts payable are not written up (written
down) in response to bad (good) news.






























. Interest income less interest expense. Conditional conservatism could arise in
respect of this item if gearing and/or the interest income and cost reflected in
the income statement respond contemporaneously to news, and the responses
to bad news and good news are asymmetric. There is some possibility of this.
However, it takes some time for gearing levels to adapt to changing circum-
stances, and there are constraints on the extent to which accounting income
can reflect contemporaneous changes in yields.
. Extraordinary items. As defined in the UK prior to FRS 3 and as defined in some
other regimes, this item would be one of the most likely sources of conditional
conservatism. However, FRS 3 introduced an extremely restrictive definition
of ‘extraordinary items’, limiting the category to highly abnormal events or
transactions of extreme rarity outside the ordinary activities of the firm.7
. Prior-period adjustment. FRS 3 defined prior-period adjustments very restric-
tively such that they ‘are rare and limited to items arising from changes in
accounting policies or from the correction of fundamental errors’ and, importantly,
excluded adjustments to estimates made in prior periods (paragraph 60). Although
prior-year adjustments relating to changes in accounting policies might provide
a route by which conditional conservatism might affect this category, such
items were predominantly mandated by changes in accounting standards.
. Foreign-currency translation difference. This item arises through changes in
the reporting-currency value of currencies in which subsidiaries prepare
their financial statements, and its effect is primarily with respect to the
opening balance sheet of those subsidiaries.
. Other dirty surplus flows. This category includes sundry items of which we
traced a sample to the financial statements. On the basis of our selective inspec-
tion of items in this category, we do not believe that it likely to be affected by
conditional conservatism.
3. The Sensitivity-Difference Measure Used in this Study
We measure sensitivity differences for our earnings measures and our earnings
components using regression model (3), due to Basu (1997):
Xit = a1 + a2DUMit + b1Rit + b2Rit × DUMit + 1it (3)
where Xit is an earnings measure or an earnings component for firm i for the
accounting period ended at time t, scaled by beginning-of-period market value,
Rit is the share return for firm i for the accounting period ended at time t as pre-
viously defined, DUMit is a dummy variable that takes the value of one where
Rit is negative, and zero otherwise, the a and b terms are regression coefficients,
and 1it is the error term. In (3), the focus of interest is b2. This is the excess of
the sensitivity of earnings or of an earnings component to negative contempora-
neous share returns over its sensitivity to positive contemporaneous share
returns. Where Xit is an earnings measure, b2 is the Basu coefficient. A significant






























positive value for b2 for an earnings measure is conventionally interpreted as
evidence of conditional-conservatism-induced asymmetric timeliness in that earn-
ings measure. Where Xit is an earnings component, b2 is the sensitivity difference
for that component. Because the explanatory variables in model (3) are the same
for all earnings measures and components thereof and because the components
of each earnings measure add up to that earnings measure, the sum of the sensitivity
differences for all components of an earnings measure is equal to the Basu coeffi-
cient for that earnings measure. This adding-up feature facilitates analysis of the
contribution of earnings components to the aggregate Basu coefficient. Regression
model (3) is estimated using pooled cross-sectional and time-series data from 1992
to 2004. Following Petersen (2008) and Gow et al. (2009), test statistics are based
on standard errors that allow for clustering both by firm and by time.
4. Decomposition of the Basu Coefficient: Sample and Data
Our data are drawn from the universe of quoted UK industrial firms that reported
in accordance with FRS 3 at any time from 1992 to 2004. Our sample construction
is summarised in Table 1 panel A. From Datastream, we collect data for 12,250
firm-years for which there is a complete set of the required balance-sheet,
income-statement and cash-flow-statement items.8 We investigate by reference
to published financial statements all firm-year cases in which the absolute value
of shareholder-fund movements not clearly identified by Datastream exceeds
1% of the absolute value of beginning-of-period shareholders’ funds. All items
investigated are assigned to an appropriate category of clean surplus earnings
or categorised as an issue or distribution of equity capital. In 453 cases, data limit-
ations prevent us from classifying movements that are greater than 1% of opening
shareholders’ funds, and these cases are eliminated. Unidentified items of less
than 1% of opening shareholders’ funds that are not individually investigated
are treated as either prior-period adjustments or other dirty surplus flows, depend-
ing on how they arise. Furthermore, in order to avoid the effect of hidden dirty
surplus flows arising from merger accounting (pooling-of-interests accounting),
the few firms within our sample that engaged in merger accounting are eliminated.
This results in the loss of 138 firm-year cases. We delete as outliers 868 firm-year
cases for which share return or any accounting data item as scaled by beginning-
of-period market value falls within the most extreme 1% of the distribution. These
procedures leave 10,791 firm-year cases. The distribution of data by years from
1992 to 2004 is given in Table 1 panel B. This panel also gives details of the
distribution of our data-set by broad industry category.
Details of the Datastream data items used to construct the earnings components
and other variables in our data-set are given in Table 2. For CFOI, investing
accruals (including depreciation), change in accounts receivable, change in
inventory and change in accounts payable, the data items are as reported in
the Statement of Cash Flows. We define ‘other operating accruals’ as the
element of the difference between operating profit and reported operating cash






























flow not accounted for by above-mentioned categories of operating accruals. This
largely comprises items reported as exceptional items within operating profit. We
define ‘special and other non-operating items’ as the element of the difference
between pre-tax income and operating profit not accounted for by interest
Table 1. Sample
Panel A: Data collection Firm-years
Firm-years reporting earnings components under FRS 3: Reporting
Financial Performance from 1992 to 2004 for which the required data
were available in Datastream.
12,250
Less: firm-years for which data limitations prevent classification of items
making up more than 1% of the periodic change in the Datastream-
reported book value of shareholders’ funds.
(453)




Less: firm-years deleted as outliers (cases for which share return or any
accounting data item as scaled by beginning-of-period market value falls
within the most extreme 1% of the distribution).
(868)
Total number of firm-years used in the study 10,791
Panel B: Distribution of firm-years by year end and by broad industry group Firm-years
By year end:
1992 [see note] 23











2004 [see note] 598
Total number of firm-years used in the study 10,791
By broad industry group:
Electronics, computers, media and pharmaceuticals 3,197
Service and retail 2,826
Other industrial 4,768
Total number of firm-years used in the study 10,791
Note: In order for a firm-year to be included in our data, the financial statements had to be prepared in
accordance with FRS 3: Reporting Financial Performance. This standard became mandatory for UK
listed firms for accounting periods ending on or after 22 June 1993, so the number of firm-year cases in
our data is fewer for 1993 than for subsequent years. A few firms adopted the standard for their 1992
year end. The discontinuation by Datastream of the accounting data series used for this study resulted
in the availability of fewer firm-years for 2004 than for previous years.






























Table 2. Variables and data items
Variables Datastream data items
Cash flow from operating and investing
activities (CFOI) (CFOI)
DS1015 2 DS1026 2 DS1029
Investing accruals (including
depreciation) (IA)
DS1026 + DS1029 2 DS976
Change in accounts receivable (D AR) DS448
Change in inventory (D Inv) DS445
2 Change in accounts payable (D AP) 2DS417
Other operating accruals (OOA) (DS993 2 DS1015) 2(DS448
+ DS445 2 DS417 2 DS976)
Operating profit (OP) DS993
Special and other non-operating items
(Special + ONO)
DS154 2 (DS993 + DS2408)
Interest income less interest expense (Int) DS2408
Pre-tax income (Pretax) DS154
2 Taxation (Tax) 2DS203
Post-tax income (Posttax) DS623
Extraordinary items (Extra) DS193
2 Minority interest and preference
dividends (Minpref)
2(DS176 + DS181)
Net income (Netinc) DS1087
Dirty surplus flows (DSF):
¼ prior-period adjustment (PPA) ¼ DS1106 less prior-period DS1107
(as adjusted after investigation of significant
differences between opening shareholders’
funds and prior-period closing shareholders’




+ revaluation gains and losses (Rev) + DS1099
2 goodwill write-offs (GW) 2(DS1102 2 DS1103)
+ other dirty surplus flows (ODSF) + (DS1100 + DS1104)
(as adjusted after investigation of cases where
movements in shareholders’ funds reported
by Datastream did not add to the
Datastream-reported change in
shareholders’ funds or where Datastream
classified items as ‘other changes in
shareholders’ funds’)
Clean surplus earnings (CSE ¼ Netinc
+ DSF)
DS1087 + DSF
Market value of shareholders’ funds (V) DSHMV 2 DS382
Dividends net of capital issues (D-N) DS187 2 DS1101
(Continued)






























income less interest expense. This includes the items classified as ‘Special Items’
by Datastream (DS1083), other non-operating items of an exceptional nature and
other non-operating items. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for earnings
components and share returns. With the exception of extraordinary items, for
which there are only nine non-zero cases, all earnings components listed in
Table 3 have more than one thousand non-zero cases.
Table 2. Continued
Variables Datastream data items
Share return, before scaling
(Vt − Vt−1) + (Dt − Nt)
D(DSHMV 2 DS382) + (DS187 2 DS1101)
(Note: Market value of shareholders’ funds is
stated net of the dividend creditor (DS382))
Note: All movements in shareholders’ funds are categorised as either a component of clean surplus
earnings or as a transaction with shareholders (distribution or issue of capital). Datastream data items
are as follows, as described in the Datastream documentation:
† DS154 Pre-tax profit
† DS176 Minority interests
† DS181 Preference dividend for period
† DS187 Ordinary dividends
† DS193 Extraordinary items
† DS203 Total tax charge
† DS382 Dividends payable
† DS417 Change in creditors (as reported in Statement of Cash Flows)
† DS445 Change in stocks and work in progress (as reported in Statement of Cash Flows)
† DS448 Change in debtors (as reported in Statement of Cash Flows)
† DS623 Published after-tax profit
† DS976 Total depreciation and amortisation of fixed assets (as reported in Statement of Cash
Flows)
† DS993 Operating profit
† DS1015 Cash inflow 2 operating activities (as reported in Statement of Cash Flows)
† DS1026 Net payments for fixed assets (as reported in Statement of Cash Flows)
† DS1029 Net payments for intangibles (as reported in Statement of Cash Flows)
† DS1087 Profit for financial year
† DS1098 Currency translation difference
† DS1099 Revaluation adjustments
† DS1100 Other recognised gains/losses for the year
† DS1101 Capital issues
† DS1102 Goodwill on acquisitions
† DS1103 Goodwill on disposals
† DS1104 Other changes in shareholders’ funds
† DS1106 Opening shareholders’ funds
† DS1107 Closing shareholders’ funds
† DS2408 Net interest charges (multiplied by 21 to give interest income less interest expense)
† DSHMV Market value of shareholders’ equity.
We define ‘other operating accruals’ as the element of the difference between operating profit and
reported operating cash flow not accounted for by other categories of operating accruals. This largely
comprises items reported as exceptional items within operating profit. We define ‘special and other
non-operating items’ as the element of the difference between pre-tax income and operating profit not
accounted for by interest income less interest expense. This includes the items classified as ‘Special
Items’ by Datastream (DS1083), other non-operating items of an exceptional nature and other non-
operating items.






























Table 3. Descriptive statistics
N Mean St. dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Panel A: Earnings components
CFOI 10,791 0.064 0.181 21.241 20.009 0.068 0.138 1.341
IA 10,791 0.000 0.093 20.732 20.024 0.001 0.027 0.631
D AR 10,791 0.016 0.100 20.729 20.009 20.009 0.038 0.735
D Inv 10,791 0.008 0.075 20.567 20.004 0.000 0.016 0.565
2 D AP 10,791 20.014 0.107 20.807 20.038 20.007 0.015 0.769
OOA 10,791 20.006 0.058 20.652 20.005 0.000 0.003 0.619
OP 10,791 0.068 0.175 21.229 0.023 0.097 0.153 1.123
Special + ONO 10,791 20.002 0.092 21.228 0.000 0.000 0.006 1.542
Int 10,791 20.018 0.034 20.304 20.027 20.009 0.001 0.098
Pretax 10,791 0.048 0.200 21.506 0.009 0.090 0.141 1.357
2 Tax 10,791 20.027 20.033 0.525 0.005 0.026 0.042 0.397
Posttax 10,791 0.021 0.182 21.516 0.002 0.063 0.101 1.210
Extra 10,791 0.000 0.004 20.077 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.298
2 Minpref 10,791 20.002 0.018 20.520 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.132
Netinc 10,791 0.019 0.181 21.534 0.001 0.061 0.099 1.210

















































































FCT 10,791 20.002 0.016 20.192 20.001 0.000 0.000 0.188
Rev 10,791 0.002 0.032 20.542 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.655
2 GW 10,791 20.011 0.126 21.933 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.674
ODSF 10,791 0.000 0.012 20.416 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.318
CSE 10,791 0.006 0.201 22.032 20.030 0.047 0.093 1.693
Panel B: Share returns
Return (R) , 0 4,854 230.6% 22.6% 289.8% 245.3% 226.1% 212.0% 0.0%
Return (R) . 0 5,937 49.7% 57.1% 0.0% 14.1% 32.3% 62.9% 451.2%
Return (R) all cases 10,791 13.6% 60.1% 289.8% 222.8% 4.9% 36.3% 451.2%
Notes:
aData are for UK industrial firms from 1992 to 2004, as reported under FRS 3: Reporting Financial Performance.
bAll earnings components are scaled by beginning-of-period market value of equity shareholders’ funds.
cCFOI is cash flow from operating and investing activities (CFOI), IA is investing accruals (comprising net payments for fixed assets and intangibles less
depreciation), D AR is change in accounts receivable, D Inv is change in inventories, D AP is change in accounts payable (descriptive statistics are for change in
accounts payable times 21), OOA is other operating accruals, OP is operating profit, Special + ONO is special and other non-operating items, Int is interest
income less interest expense, Pretax is pre-tax income, Tax is taxation (descriptive statistics are for taxation times 21), Posttax is post-tax income, Extra is
extraordinary items, Minpref is minority interest and preference dividends (descriptive statistics are for minority interest and preference dividends times 21),
Netinc is net income, PPA is prior-period adjustment, FCT is foreign-currency translation difference, Rev is revaluation gains and losses, GW is goodwill write-












































































































5. Decomposition of the Basu Coefficient: Results
5.1. Main Results
Table 4 reports results from the standard Basu (1997) regression model (3) for
clean surplus earnings and its components. All components for which a positive
value reduces earnings (change in accounts payable, taxation, minority interest
and preference dividends and goodwill write-offs) are multiplied by 21, so the
reported regression coefficients for all components add to the corresponding
coefficients for relevant earnings measures. Table 5 summarises whether the
results in Table 4 are consistent with the conditional conservatism interpretation
of the Basu coefficient. In Table 5, the items classified as likely to be affected by
conditional conservatism are listed in rank order by reference to our judgement
as to their likelihood of being affected.
The results reported in Table 4 for aggregate earnings measures are consistent
with those of prior studies. The Basu coefficient (b2) from model (3) is positive
and significantly different from zero for all of the earnings measures (operating
profit, pre-tax income, post-tax income, net income and clean surplus earnings),
with the t-statistics for these b2 coefficients all being in excess of 10. A similar
result, of opposite sign, is reported for taxation, which is highly negatively cor-
related with pre-tax income, and for minority interest and preference dividends,
which contains an element that is negatively correlated with post-tax income.
For the seven items believed to be affected by conditional-conservatism-
induced asymmetric timeliness, the Basu coefficient is positive and significantly
different from zero in six cases: investing accruals (b2: 0.035, t-statistic: 3.42);
change in accounts receivable (b2: 0.031, t-statistic: 4.23); change in inventory
(b2: 0.029, t-statistic: 3.44); other operating accruals (b2: 0.043, t-statistic:
4.50); special and other non-operating items (b2: 0.034, t-statistic: 2.78); revalua-
tion gains and losses (b2: 0.005, t-statistic: 2.19). The only one of these seven
items for which the sensitivity difference is not positive and significantly differ-
ent from zero is goodwill (b2: 20.002, t-statistic: 20.35). However, there was a
major change in the treatment of this item from 1998, when FRS 10 prohibited the
previously predominant practice of writing off goodwill to equity; from 1998 this
item comprised only write-backs on disposal of previously written off goodwill.
We therefore estimate model (3) for goodwill separately for the intervals before
and after the change. We find that the b2 coefficient for goodwill is positive and
significantly different from zero for 1992–97 but not for 1998–2004. In Table 5,
we therefore interpret the result for this item as consistent with the conditional
conservatism interpretation of the Basu coefficient. Therefore, for all seven of
the components believed to be affected by conditional conservatism, the results
are consistent with the conditional conservatism interpretation of the Basu coef-
ficient. However, within this group, there is only weak evidence of association
between the magnitude of the b2 coefficients and our judgements as to the like-
lihood that components are affected by conservatism: although the five highest
ranked items have much higher b2 coefficients than the two lowest ranked






























Table 4. Results from estimation of the sensitivity-difference-measurement regression
model (3)




CFOI (CFOI) 0.105 20.020 20.024 0.207 5.74
(18.89)∗∗ (23.07)∗∗ (21.94) (9.51)∗∗
Investing accruals (IA) 0.005 20.001 20.000 0.035 0.69












Change in inventory (D Inv) 0.012 20.001 0.001 0.029 0.87
(4.58)∗∗ (20.23) (0.53) (3.44)∗∗






















Operating profit (OP) 0.117 20.008 20.012 0.319 14.74























Pre-tax income (Pretax) 0.100 20.006 20.009 0.348 14.00
(15.32)∗∗ (20.72) (20.60) (10.88)∗∗
2 Taxation (Tax) 20.035 0.006 20.002 20.038 11.92
(231.89)∗∗ (5.60)∗∗ (20.62) (210.76)∗∗
Post-tax income (Posttax) 0.065 20.000 20.011 0.310 12.27
(11.53)∗∗ (20.07) (20.91) (10.62)∗∗
Extraordinary items (Extra) 0.000 20.000 20.000 20.001 0.06
(1.21) (21.36) (20.65) (21.22)









Net income (Netinc) 0.062 20.001 20.011 0.304 12.09


































2 Goodwill (GW) 20.010 0.001 20.013 20.002 0.46
(21.97)∗ (0.42) (21.40) (20.35)











Clean surplus earnings 0.051 0.001 20.024 0.308 8.51
(CSE) (7.62)∗∗ (0.08) (22.81)∗∗ (10.79)∗∗
(Continued)






























items (revaluation gains and losses; goodwill), the coefficient for goodwill for
1992–97 only is larger than those of the five highest ranked items (see note b
to Table 5).
Of the seven items believed not to be affected by conditional conservatism, the
sensitivity difference is positive and significantly different from zero in only one
case: CFOI (b2: 0.207, t-statistic: 9.51). Not only is this coefficient highly statisti-
cally significant, it is also large relative to the Basu coefficients for the earnings
measures for which results are reported in Table 4, which fall in the range 0.304–
0.348.9 As CFOI cannot be directly affected by accounting-conservatism-induced
asymmetric timeliness, the effect observed here may be due to asymmetric
response of cash flow to bad news and good news but cannot be directly due
to conditional conservatism. This result for CFOI, together with similar results
Table 4. Continued




























aThe results reported above are from the estimation of the following pooled cross-section time-series
regression model:
Xit = a1 + a2DUMit + b1Rit + b2Rit × DUMit + 1it (3)
where Xit is an earnings measure or component for firm i for the accounting period ended at time t, scaled
by the market value of equity shareholders’ funds at the beginning of that period; Rit is the share return
for the accounting period ended at time t; DUMit is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when
Rit is negative, and zero otherwise; the a and b terms are regression coefficients; 1it is the error term. b2
is the Basu coefficient where Xit is an earnings measure, and is the sensitivity difference for that
component where Xit is an earnings component. t-statistics are given in parentheses.
∗ (∗∗) denotes
significance at the 5% (1%) level in a two-sided test. Following Petersen (2008) and Gow et al.
(2009), our test statistics are based on two-way cluster-robust standard errors. The number of cases is
10,791. The data used in the regression models in respect of change in accounts payable, taxation,
minority interest and preference dividends and goodwill write-offs are multiplied by 21. Thus, the
coefficients for these earnings components can be added to those of all other components to give the
coefficients for the relevant earnings measures.
bThe sum of all conservatism items is the sum of all items judged to be affected by conditional
conservatism: Investing accruals (IA) + Change in accounts receivable (D AR) + Change in inventory
(D Inv) + Other operating accruals (OOA) + Special and other non-operating items (Special + ONO)
+ Revaluation gains and losses (Rev) 2 Goodwill (GW). The sum of all non-conservatism items (except
CFOI) is the sum of all items except CFOI judged not to be affected by conditional conservatism: 2
Change in accounts payable (D AP) + Interest income less interest expense (Int) + Extraordinary
items (Extra) + Prior-period adjustment (PPA) + Foreign-currency translation difference (FCT) +
Other dirty surplus flows (ODSF).
















































Items believed to be affected by
conditional conservatism (listed in
rank order):
Other operating accruals (OOA) (1st
equal)
0.043 14.0% Yes Yes
Special and other non-operating items
(Special + ONO) (1st equal)
0.034 11.0% Yes Yes
Change in accounts receivable (D AR)
(3rd equal)
0.031 10.1% Yes Yes
Change in inventory (D Inv) (3rd
equal)
0.029 9.4% Yes Yes
Investing accruals (IA) (5th) 0.035 11.4% Yes Yes
Revaluation gains and losses (Rev)
(6th equal)
0.005 1.6% Yes Yes
2 Goodwill (GW) (6th equal) 20.002 20.7% No Yes
0.175 56.8% (See note b)
Items believed not to be affected by
conditional conservatism:
Cash flow:
CFOI (CFOI) 0.207 67.2% Yes No
Items other than CFOI believed not to
be affected by conditional
conservatism:
2 Change in accounts payable (D AP) 20.026 28.4% No Yes
Interest income less interest expense
(Int)
20.005 21.6% No Yes
Extraordinary items (Extra) 20.001 20.3% No Yes
Prior-period adjustment (PPA) 0.002 0.6% No Yes
Foreign-currency translation
difference (FCT)
20.001 20.3% No Yes
Other dirty surplus flows (ODSF) 20.000 20.0% No Yes
20.031 210.0%
Other items:
2 Taxation (Tax) 20.038 212.4%






aThe information tabulated is based on the b2 coefficients from regression model (3) reported in
Table 4.
bThe b2 coefficient for goodwill is not positive and significantly different from zero for the data-set as a
whole. However, because of the fundamental change in the accounting for goodwill brought about by
FRS 10 from 1998, we also estimate model (3) separately for the interval 1992–97, during which
direct write-off of goodwill to equity was standard practice in the UK, and for the interval from 1998
to 2004, during which such write-offs were not permitted and movements within this category
comprised only write-backs on disposal. The b2 coefficient on goodwill is positive and significantly
different from zero in the first interval (b2: 0.056, t-statistic: 2.33), but not in the second. We
interpret this result as consistent with the conditional conservatism interpretation of the Basu coefficient.






























reported by other studies in respect of cash-flow measures, suggests that, where
the Basu coefficient is used to measure conditional accounting conservatism, it
may be advisable to test the robustness of results to the exclusion of the
element of the coefficient due to cash flows. For the other six items believed
not to be affected by conditional conservatism, in no case is the sensitivity
difference positive and significantly different from zero: change in accounts
payable (b2: 20.026, t-statistic: 24.28); interest income less interest expense
(b2: 20.005, t-statistic: 20.89); extraordinary items (b2: 20.001, t-statistic:
21.22); prior-period adjustment (b2: 0.002, t-statistic: 0.74); foreign-currency
translation difference (b2: 20.001, t-statistic: 20.46); other dirty surplus flows
(b2: 20.000, t-statistic: 20.79). The only one of these b2 coefficients that is
significantly different from zero is that for change in accounts payable. We
investigate this coefficient in light of the possibility that it arises in part
because of association between accounts payable and other components of
working capital. We find that the b2 for the residuals from a regression of
change in accounts payable on change in accounts receivable and change in
inventories is not significantly different from zero. This suggests that the
significant negative sensitivity difference for change in accounts payable is due
to association between accounts payable and other components of working
capital rather than to any underlying sensitivity difference for that item.10
As the aggregate of all items classified as likely to be affected by conditional
conservatism is a potential focus for studies of conditional conservatism, we also
report at the foot of Table 4 the coefficients and test statistics for that aggregate,
along with corresponding statistics for the aggregate of all items classified as not
likely to be affected by conditional conservatism except for CFOI. The b2 coeffi-
cients and t-statistics for these two items are, respectively: b2: 0.175, t-statistic:
5.73; b2: 20.031, t-statistic: 24.47.
In summary, the results reported above suggest that researchers using the Basu
coefficient as an indicator of conditional conservatism should test the robustness
of their results to the exclusion of the element of the coefficient due to cash flows,
but are otherwise consistent with the conditional conservatism interpretation of
the coefficient.
5.2. Test of Robustness of Results to the Bias Documented by Patatoukas and
Thomas (2009)
As mentioned in the introduction, Patatoukas and Thomas (2009) report that
association between return volatility and the probability of a loss can cause a
bias in the Basu coefficient large enough to induce an apparent sensitivity differ-
ence for lagged earnings with respect to return, which cannot be due to con-
ditional conservatism. In light of the evidence of such a bias in the Basu
coefficient, we examine whether the sensitivity differences reported in this
study may be due to that bias. We do so by replicating for our earnings measures
and earnings components a test that Patatoukas and Thomas (2009) implemented






























for earnings. This involves re-estimating our regression model (3) for each earn-
ings measure and earnings component, using as the dependent variables the
lagged earnings measures and components in place of the contemporaneous earn-
ings measures and components, and examining whether b2 coefficients for lagged
earnings measures and lagged earnings components with respect to contempora-
neous share returns are significant. For this lagged-dependent-variable procedure,
we eliminate the first case for each firm and those cases for which the previous-
period case is deleted as an outlier, giving a reduced data-set of 8,386 cases. In
order to allow comparison of the lagged-dependent-variable results with the con-
temporaneous-dependent-variable results reported in Tables 4 and 5 and with the
contemporaneous-dependent-variable results for the reduced data-set, Table 6
reports three sets of b2 coefficients (sensitivity differences). Column 2 gives
the b2 coefficients from regression model (3) for the complete data-set as
reported in Table 4 (n ¼ 10,791); column 3 reports the corresponding coeffi-
cients where the dependent variable is a lagged earnings measure or earnings
component for the reduced data-set (n ¼ 8,386); column 4 reports the corre-
sponding coefficients where the dependent variable is a contemporaneous earn-
ings measure or earnings component for the reduced data-set (n ¼ 8,386).
From comparison of columns 2 and 4, it can be seen that estimation of the con-
temporaneous-dependent-variable version of regression model (3) gives very
similar results for the full data-set and the reduced data-set. We now consider
the lagged-dependent-variable results reported in column 3. Consistent with Pata-
toukas and Thomas (2009), the b2 coefficients for all of our lagged earnings
measures are positive and significantly different from zero. This is supportive
of the Patatoukas and Thomas (2009) argument that the Basu coefficient for
aggregate earnings is significantly affected by a bias not directly related to
accounting conservatism. However, the sensitivity difference for lagged earnings
in our data is heavily concentrated in lagged CFOI. The b2 coefficient for CFOI is
0.186 (t-statistic: 8.48) and that for clean surplus earnings is 0.195 (t-statistic:
11.51). Also, of the seven earnings components that we classify as likely to be
affected by conditional conservatism, including goodwill for 1992–97, investing
accruals is the only one that has a sensitivity difference for the lagged component
that is positive and significantly different from zero (b2: 0.021, t-statistic: 3.03).
For the other six components classified as likely to be affected by conditional
conservatism, including other operating accruals and special and other non-oper-
ating items which are particularly likely to be affected, the b2 for the lagged com-
ponent is not significantly different from zero.
In our data, the non-conditional-conservatism bias documented by Patatoukas
and Thomas (2009) does not appear to be an important cause of the sensitivity
differences for those earnings components likely to be affected by conditional
conservatism, but it does appear to be an important cause of the sensitivity differ-
ence for CFOI, which cannot be directly due to conditional conservatism. This is
supportive of our inference that, subject to the need to test the robustness of
results to the exclusion of the element of the Basu coefficient due to cash






























Table 6. Evidence on sensitivity differences for earnings components and the Patatoukas
and Thomas (2009) bias
Dependent variables (X)
b2coefficients as
reported in Table 4









CFOI (CFOI) 0.207 0.186 0.183
(9.51)∗∗ (8.48)∗∗ (8.27)∗∗
Investing accruals (IA) 0.035 0.021 0.039
(3.42)∗∗ (3.03)∗∗ (3.29)∗∗








Change in inventory (D Inv) 0.029 0.012 0.031
(3.44)∗∗ (1.41) (3.64)∗∗








Other operating accruals (OOA) 0.043 0.019 0.041
(4.50)∗∗ (1.90) (4.70)∗∗
Operating profit (OP) 0.319 0.229 0.303
(10.61)∗∗ (7.38)∗∗ (12.66)∗∗
Special and other non-operating















Pre-tax income (Pretax) 0.348 0.232 0.338
(10.88)∗∗ (8.91)∗∗ (13.98)∗∗
2 Taxation (Tax) 20.038 20.035 20.041
(210.76)∗∗ (210.07)∗∗ (213.23)∗∗
Post-tax income (Posttax) 0.310 0.197 0.297
(10.62)∗∗ (8.38)∗∗ (13.76)∗∗
Extraordinary items (Extra) 20.001 0.000 20.001
(21.22) (0.76) (21.28)








Net income (Netinc) 0.304 0.196 0.293
(10.44)∗∗ (8.13)∗∗ (13.52)∗∗


















2 Goodwill (GW) (see note b) 20.002 20.001 20.012
(20.35) (20.04) (21.03)
(Continued)






























flows, our findings are consistent with the conditional conservatism interpretation
of the coefficient.
6. Conclusion
The Basu coefficient, which measures the excess of the sensitivity of accounting
earnings to negative share returns over its sensitivity to positive share returns, is
widely used as an indicator of conditional-conservatism-induced asymmetric
timeliness in the recognition within earnings of bad news and good news.




reported in Table 4









Other dirty surplus flows (ODSF) 20.000 0.000 20.001
(20.79) (0.12) (21.39)
Clean surplus earnings (CSE) 0.308 0.195 0.291
(10.79)∗∗ (11.51)∗∗ (11.96)∗∗
Sum of all conservatism items 0.175 0.055 0.185
(5.73)∗∗ (3.55)∗∗ (6.34)∗∗









aThis table reports b2 coefficients (sensitivity differences) from the following versions of regression
model (3):
Column 2: where the dependent variable is a contemporaneous earnings measure or earnings
component, for the complete data-set as reported in Table 4 (number of cases ¼ 10,791);
Column 3: where the dependent variable is a lagged earnings measure or earnings component, for all
cases for which results are reported in Tables 4 and 5 except the first case for each firm and those cases
for which the previous-period case is deleted as an outlier (number of cases ¼ 8,386);
Column 4: where the dependent variable is a contemporaneous earnings measure or earnings
component, for all cases for which results are reported in Tables 4 and 5 except the first case for
each firm and those cases for which the previous-period case is deleted as an outlier (number of
cases ¼ 8,386).
∗ (∗∗) denotes significance at the 5% (1%) level in a two-sided test. Following Petersen (2008) and
Gow et al. (2009), our test statistics are based on two-way cluster-robust standard errors. The data
used in the regression models in respect of change in accounts payable, taxation, minority interest
and preference dividends and goodwill write-offs are multiplied by 21. Thus, the coefficients for
these earnings components can be added to those of all other components to give the coefficients
for the relevant earnings measures.
bThe b2 coefficient for goodwill for the interval 1992–97, during which direct write-off of goodwill to
equity was standard practice in the UK, is positive and significantly different from zero when
contemporaneous goodwill is regressed on contemporaneous return (corresponding to columns 2 and
4 above), but not when lagged goodwill is regressed on contemporaneous return (corresponding to
column 3 above).






























found in the extensive evidence that it is associated with factors predicted to be
associated with conditional conservatism. However, there are grounds for
concern that the Basu coefficient may reflect things other than conditional
accounting conservatism, and that this might interfere with its interpretability
as an indicator of that phenomenon.
In this study, we argue that evidence on the validity of the Basu coefficient as
an indicator of conditional conservatism can be obtained by disaggregating earn-
ings into components, classifying those components by whether or not they are
likely to be affected by conditional conservatism, and examining whether or
not the Basu coefficient arises primarily from components classified as likely
to be affected by conditional conservatism. We then implement this procedure
for a sample of UK firms reporting under FRS 3: Reporting Financial Perform-
ance in periods from 1992 to 2004. With the notable exception of CFOI, for
which we report a large and statistically significant positive sensitivity difference,
and when consideration of goodwill write-offs is limited to the time from 1992 to
1997 only, the sensitivity difference for each earnings component classified as
likely (unlikely) to be affected by conditional conservatism is (is not) positive
and significantly different from zero. By measuring the sensitivity differences
for lagged earnings measures and earnings components with respect to contem-
poraneous share returns, we also seek evidence as to whether sensitivity differ-
ences reported in this study may be the artefact of the non-conservatism bias
documented by Patatoukas and Thomas (2009). We find that the bias documented
by Patatoukas and Thomas (2009) is present in all of our aggregate earnings
measures, but that it is heavily concentrated in the CFOI component of earnings
and largely absent from components of earnings that we classify as likely to be
affected by conditional conservatism. Our result for CFOI, together with
similar results reported by other studies and our test for the Patatoukas and
Thomas (2009) bias, suggests that, where the Basu coefficient is used to
measure conditional accounting conservatism, it may be advisable to test the
robustness of results to the exclusion of the element of the coefficient due to
cash flows. Otherwise, the results of this study are consistent with the conditional
conservatism interpretation of the coefficient.
Our results are subject to a number of caveats. First, although our results are
supportive of the conditional conservatism interpretation of the Basu coefficient,
they do not rule out the possibility that the sensitivity differences in non-
cash-flow components of earnings might be due in part to factors other than
conditional conservatism, such as those referred to in the introduction to this
study. Second, our inferences are conditional on some relatively strong assump-
tion regarding the classification of components as likely and not likely to be
affected by conditional conservatism, although we should emphasise that this
classification is based on a detailed review of accounting regulation and practice
during the interval covered by the study. Third, we have limited our focus to the
plausibility of the conditional conservatism interpretation of the Basu coefficient
in light of accounting regulation and practice with regard to earnings






























components, and have not sought to address economic or behavioural determi-
nants of conditional conservatism.
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Notes
1Some analysis related to that proposed and carried out in this study has been done previously,
but at a less detailed level than in this study. By comparing the sensitivity difference for
indirectly measured cash flows with that for earnings, Basu (1997) infers that the Basu coeffi-
cient is primarily due to the accruals component of earnings rather than to the cash-flow com-
ponent. Also, using a number of news proxies including abnormal share return, Ball and
Shivakumar (2006) report that total accruals and total working capital accruals are more sensi-
tive to bad news than to good news.
2The start of the interval coincides with the introduction of FRS 3, which was mandatory for
accounting periods ending on or after 22 June 1993 and ends with the discontinuation by the
Datastream financial database of the accounting data series used in this study, which coincides
approximately with the time at which UK listed firms were required to adopt International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) and ceased to report in accordance with FRS 3. UK
listed firms were required to adopt IFRSs for accounting periods starting after 1 January 2005.
3Prior to FRS 3, the reporting of income components was significantly less uniform than under
FRS 3, particularly in the case of gains and losses reported outside net income; after the intro-
duction of IFRSs, there were changes in the reporting of income, including with regard to items
that were classified as ‘exceptional items’ under FRS 3 (see FRS 3 and Ernst and Young LLP,
2008, chap. 3).
4To the extent that share issues are recorded at prices different from market value, for example, as a
result of employees exercising options, clean surplus earnings as defined in (1a) does not conform
to what Christensen and Feltham (2003) call ‘super clean surplus’. When share issues are
recorded at a price other than market value, it will usually be at a discount reflecting the dilutive
effect of the transaction, resulting in clean surplus earnings being larger than ‘super clean surplus’
earnings. This non-conservative aspect of accounting is not addressed in this study.
5FRS 15, which superseded SSAP 12: Accounting for Depreciation (ASC, 1977) for accounting
periods ending on or after 23 March 2000, prohibited the previously permitted recognition as an
exceptional item of the entire accumulated depreciation effect of a change in estimated asset
life. Since this change affected an item categorised within ‘other operating accruals’, it did
not materially affect our measure of depreciation.
6See Ernst and Young LLP (1999, chap. 22, pp. 1500–1503) for discussion of possible conflict
between FRS 3 and SSAP 2 with regard to provisions.
7In our data-set comprising 10,791 firm-years, there are only nine firm-years where extraordi-
nary items are not equal to zero. Examination of these cases confirmed that they arose from
events of a highly abnormal nature, including events associated with related-party transactions.
8Cases excluded from this set include those where there is a significant discrepancy between the
Datastream-reported operating profits given by the income statement and the Datastream-
reported operating profits given by the statement of cash flows, and some cases of multiple






























classes of shares in issue where we are unable to satisfy ourselves as to the consistency between
balance-sheet data and market-value data.
9When model (3) is amended in order to include reported operating cash flows instead of CFOI,
the b2 coefficient on reported operating cash flows is positive and of a similar magnitude to that
for CFOI, and is significantly different from zero.
10As a robustness test, we follow Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) by estimating a version of
model (3) augmented to include beginning-of-period book-to-market-ratio interaction terms.
Also, in light of the scope under FRS 1 for non-operating exceptional items and other operating
accruals to reflect compensating items arising from cash flows relating to non-operating excep-
tional items, we estimate model (3) for the aggregate of (i) other operating accruals and (ii)
special and other non-operating items. (See Ernst and Young LLP (1999, pp. 1740–1741)
for discussion of what was regarded as a controversial treatment by FRS 1 of cash flows relating
to some non-operating exceptional items.) Our inferences are robust to these tests.
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